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 Introduction
Does international law matter, or is it but a “fairy ship upon a fairy sea: a beautiful 
construct of the legal imagination floating upon a sea of false assumptions[?]”2  International 
legal compliance [“ILC”],3 the newest and most rapidly developing subfield in international law, 
was born in the early 1990s from the revived debate between legalization theorists, a group 
committed to the belief that the transformations wrought by the end of the Cold War have 
rendered international law independently capable of constraining and shaping the behavior of 
states, and their critics, a camp committed to the contrary notion that international law remains 
primarily an aspirational enterprise subordinate to politics and epiphenomenal to state practice.  
In attempting to prevail on the question of the efficacy of international law, legalists and skeptics 
alike have set about propounding and testing an array of interrelated theories, and in the process 
the questions of whether, and if so, why and under what circumstances states elect to comply 
with international law have emerged as the most central and pressing issues within the 
international legal academy.  Building upon the insights of international relations theory and the 
methodologies of the social sciences, the field of ILC has organized around competing answers 
to these meta-questions, and the body of ILC scholarship now consists of eight books and nearly 
one hundred articles.
This Bibliography lists and annotates the major entries within the ILC corpus.  For each 
entry a brief summary, together with one or more numbers corresponding to a list of major ILC 
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2themes, is provided.  Although it is intended to be complete and comprehensive, the 
Bibliography does not list every article that could arguably be included within the ILC corpus.  
Short articles duplicative of the previous work of scholars have been omitted, as have articles 
that are tangentially connected to ILC or are largely descriptive, rather than analytical.  Although 
the majority of ILC scholars are legal academics, an effort has been made to include the works of 
authors in related fields such as international relations and economics.
The methodology is as follows.  A search of Westlaw, Lexis, and Worldcat was 
conducted to identify every potential book and article in the field of ILC.  Each source was then 
read to ensure that it fit within the field.  Additional articles cited or discussed by the authors of 
each source were noted for possible inclusion.  A preliminary draft of the Bibliography was sent 
to each author for comments, corrections, and suggestions for additional authors and sources.
To be included in the Bibliography, each source was required to address one or more 
themes that constitute the field of ILC.  These themes, along with the number and letter scheme 
employed to denote them, are as follows:
1. General theory.  Many ILC scholars have advanced competing theories to explain and 
predict patterns of compliance and noncompliance in international relations.  These various 
theories, described in the annotations accompanying relevant bibliographic entries, can be 
organized into the following series of theoretical clusters: (a) realism, (b) enforcement theory, (c) 
rational choice theory, (d) liberal theory, (e) managerial theory, (f) reputational theory, (g) 
transnational legal process, (h) legitimacy theory, (i) constructivism, (j) organizational-cultural 
theory, and (k) personality theory.  
2. Empirical analysis.  ILC scholars are increasingly moving beyond mere descriptive 
work or thought experimentation and are subjecting ILC theories to empirical analysis.  Several 
have applied the methodological tools of the social and natural sciences, including multivariate 
3statistics, rigorous comparative analysis, and detailed case studies, to develop testable and 
falsifiable general propositions regarding relationships between rules and behaviors and to 
inform proposals for regime modification.  
3. Skeptics.  A minority of ILC scholars insist that compliance is the exception rather 
than the rule and that international law is little more than an aspirational venture.  Some, without 
rejecting outright the causal significance of law in regard to state behaviors, contend that 
legalization inversely correlates with compliance with the normative principles underlying 
regimes.
4. Critical perspectives.  Several scholars treat the question of compliance as the point of 
entry to challenge international law more generally as illegitimate for failing to include or for 
subordinating a plethora of subnational organizations, groups, and peoples.
5. Relationship to domestic law and institutions.  A number of scholars link compliance 
with international law to the structure or function of domestic law or institutions, typically by 
treating incorporation of international law within the domestic legal system as a necessary 
condition precedent to compliance or by describing domestic courts as the only effective sites for 
enforcement.
6. High/Low Politics.  The assumption central to the discipline of international law that 
regards international relations as uniformly susceptible to legal regulation may well be false.  
Some ILC scholars contend very directly that a hierarchy of issue-areas orders the international 
legal system and that patterns of cooperation have been far easier to generate and sustain in 
respect to “low politics,” generally understood as economic, cultural, and social issues, than in 
questions of “high politics,” defined narrowly as matters of war and peace.  Other scholars, 
without directly asserting a high/low politics distinction, simply confine their analyses of 
4findings to the particular low politics issue-areas under investigation and refrain from 
generalizing to other issue-areas.
7. Survey.  Many of the authors provide an overview, description, and a critique of some 
or all of the various ILC theories.
8. Human Agency.  A small group of scholars with interdisciplinary backgrounds regards 
the state as an abstraction without the capacity to exercise a choice between alternatives and thus 
treats the question of compliance as one of human agency.  For human agency theorists within 
the ILC field, people, rather than states, make compliance decisions, and the objective of their 
scholarship is producing an account for the microfoundations of personality that are causally 
linked to compliance. 
9. Methodological and Epistemological Issues.   Part of the literature within the ILC field 
is dedicated to the operationalization of the concept of compliance as a testable phenomenon, the 
design of experiments to test causal relationships between legal regimes and state behaviors, the 
selection and application of analytical methods to assess compliance data, the systematic and 
rigorous interpretation of research findings, the validation of data, methods, and conclusions, and 
the articulation and evaluation of knowledge claims.
10.  Effectiveness.  A group of empirically-minded scholars have called into question 
whether “compliance” is an adequate conceptual framework within which to evaluate whether 
international legal regimes further their normative policy objectives.  Because a high level of 
compliance with a given regime may simply reflect the failure to require states to undertake 
anything more than modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an 
agreement, and because certain agreements that impose significant constraints may meet with 
relatively low levels of compliance without sabotaging the norms states-parties seek to advance, 
the concept of “effectiveness”, defined as the degree to which a regime is successful in 
5transforming state behaviors consistent with the norms that underlie the regime, has been 
introduced as a substitute for compliance.
The following annotations, of course, cannot begin to do justice to the rich body of 
thought they summarize; at most, they identify several major themes in each source.  Readers are 
encouraged to engage with the complete works themselves.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbott, Kenneth W., “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control 
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1 (1993). (1e, 2).
Develops a modified rational choice theory of compliance that assumes that self-
interested states can be motivated to cooperate provided uncertainties as to other states’ 
intentions and actions that impede cooperation can be reduced through a combination of 
verification and assurance procedures.  Employs iterated prisoners’ dilemma to the study of 
several arms control regimes to support the hypothesis that enhanced monitoring and verification 
are complementary strategies that promote compliance by increasing transparency, equalizing 
information, and enhancing payoffs for cooperation.  Suggests that the appropriate package of 
measures is specific to each treaty member and that general theories of compliance are perhaps 
beyond the state of the discipline, at least in the issue-area of arms control.
Aceves, William J., Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of 
Equitable Distribution, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 299 (2001). (3,4,5).
Imports insights from Critical Legal Studies metatheory to reinforce the central premise 
of legitimacy theory and transnational legal process theory: that compliance is a function of the 
degree to which substance and process of a legal regime is generally perceived as fair and 
inclusive of all stakeholders.  Suggests that existing international institutional designs are 
insufficiently legitimate because they fail to incorporate a great many subnational groups.   
Faults the principle of equitable distribution for broadening the inclusiveness of institutions with 
regard to states but perpetuating the exclusion of subnational organizations, groups, peoples, and 
people.  Suggests, but does not specify, a deconstructivist program for enhancing the fairness of 
international law is the proper direction for the marriage of CLS and ILC theories.
Alder, Jacqueline, & Lugten, Gaul, Frozen Fish Block: How Committed are North Atlantic States 
to Accountability, Conservation and Management of Fisheries?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 345 
(2002). (2,10). 
Surmises that compliance rates are positively correlated with per capita gross national 
product.  Cautions, however, that many states, without regard to wealth, often substitute 
instrument compliance, defined as the ratification of an international agreement to “satisfy the 
public face of international law” and appease domestic constituencies without the intent to 
actually alter national behaviors, for genuine compliance.
Aldrich, George H., Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects, in Effecting Compliance 
(Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer, eds., 2000). (5,6).
6Lists major causal factors of noncompliance as ignorance of legal obligations, skepticism 
as to the efficacy of enforcement measures, and absence of effective monitoring and dispute-
resolution mechanisms.  Suggests that domestic incorporation of international law is a necessary 
condition precedent to compliance.  Regards the project of effecting compliance with the laws of 
war as the major challenge of the contemporary international legal order.
Alvarez, Jose E., Why Nations Behave, 19 Mich. J. Int’l. L. 303 (1998). (7)
Maps out the immediate post-Cold War origins of ILC and surveys convergence of 
international law and international relations scholarship in the form of several emerging theories, 
including managerialism, liberalism, enforcement theory, and constructivism.  Suggests that the 
various divergent ILC theories may ultimately converge around transnational legal process 
theory, which posits that internalization of cooperative norms in domestic law and legal 
institutions fosters the progressive evolution of rule-governed cooperation.
American Society of International Law, How are Nations Behaving?, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
205 (2002). (7,9).
Hypothesizes that failure to accede to international legal regimes may be the functional 
equivalent of noncompliance, particularly for hegemonic states.  Notes that recent empirical 
scholarship has called into question the presumption that compliance is the rule rather than the 
exception, yet notes further that empiricism in the ILC field is impeded by limitations on data, 
selection biases, difficulties in generalizing from limited data sets and from one issue-area to 
another, and methodological obstacles to conceptualizing compliance.  Describes the state of the 
discipline as rife with theoretical divergence yet ripe for future discoveries on the basis of a 
dynamic interdisciplinary research agenda.
Ardia, David S., Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws 
Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 497 (1998). (1e, 2).
Sketches the limitations of the enforcement model of ILC in regard to international 
marine environmental protection, including a lack of clarity as to jurisdiction, the costliness of 
sanctions, and the abundance of violations by non-state actors.  Proposes that successful 
enforcement requires more effective detection of noncompliance which in turn requires enhanced 
monitoring.  Posits that NGOs have a role to play as compliance monitors.
Arend, Anthony Clark, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 
Va. J. Int’l L. 107 (1998). (1i, 7).
Surveys and critiques theories of ILC.  Argues that constructivism, which regards 
compliance as a function of the congruence between the socially-constructed normative 
preferences of key states and individuals on the one hand and formal legal rules on the other, 
provides the greatest insight into explanation and prediction of patterns of state compliance.
Bailey, Robert A., Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in 
Two Gulf Wars, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 103 (2000). (2,8).
Examines the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War and rejects the 
central premise of enforcement theory—that sanctions, or the threat of reprisal, are sufficient to 
enforce compliance with legal obligations.  Suggests that variance in compliance with the laws of 
war as between states is attributable primarily to individual-level psychological attributes of 
decisionmakers responsible for compliance decisions.  Concludes that failures to comply with 
7legal regimes that codify norms of jus cogens may be inexplicable through rational choice 
theory.
Baxter, Richard, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, Am. Soc. Int’l L. 82 (1964). (1b, 
3, 5, 8).
Treats individuals as the primary subjects of the laws of war.  Develops one of the earliest 
articulations of enforcement theory within the ILC canon.  Regards compliance with the 
international laws of war as a function of whether the domestic laws of the states of nationality 
create adequate punitive sanctions and whether domestic military institutions effectively 
investigate and prosecute offenses.
BEYERLIN, ULRICH, & MARAUHN, THILO, LAW-MAKING AND LAW-
ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE 1992 RIO 
CONFERENCE (1997). (1e, 2, 5)
Argues that the most effective means of achieving compliance with international 
environmental law is a flexible and ad hoc strategy of law-enforcement based on partnership 
rather than traditional, repressive means of law-enforcement, such as unilateral sanctions or 
reprisals. Describes as “compliance control” procedures of reporting, monitoring, fact-finding, 
and consultation designed to reduce conflict and tension between states and as “compliance 
assistance” the provision of environmental education and training, personnel, administrative and 
legislative support, and technology transfers to less-developed states.
Bhattacharyya, Rupa, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International Criminal Justice System, 31 Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 57 (1996). (3,5).
Argues that compliance with international criminal law is a function of the degree to 
which the substantive rules are widely perceived as legitimate.  Predicts that formalization of 
international criminal law will correlate with increased compliance.  Concludes that the success 
of international criminal legal institutions such as the ICC will hinge upon voluntary compliance, 
which in turn will require its rules of substantive law, as well as its procedures, to be widely 
perceived as legitimate. 
Bird, Robert C., Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of Space Debris, 40 Am. 
Bus. L.J. 635 (2003). (1i, 8).
Dismisses sanctions or other mechanisms recommended by enforcement theory as useful 
to the promotion of cooperation regarding the control of space debris.  Counters with a 
constructivist account that credits epistemic communities of scientists with responsibility for 
generating norms and securing compliance with legal rules incorporating these norms through 
the mobilization of shame, or the use of peer pressure.  Argues that government officials who 
must ultimately determine whether to comply with resulting regimes are sensitive to and 
dependent upon the scientific community and will be discouraged from noncompliance by their 
scientific advisors, who would suffer shame if they did not dissuade officials from 
noncompliance.
Bradford, William C., In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2005). (1k, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9).
Surveys and critiques existing ILC theories.  Develops a personality-based theory to 
explain and predict compliance with the law of war regime governing anticipatory self-defense.  
Describes the use of simulation research to test and refine personality theories of ILC. 
8Bradley, Curtis A., Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 
Stan. L. Rev. 529 (1999). (1a, 3, 5).
Suggests that the U.S. interest in international legal compliance is structurally 
subordinated to its commitment to federalism and its dualist legal system.  Implies that monist 
legal systems are, ceterus paribus, more likely to comply with international law than dualist 
systems, which regard domestic law as occupying the apex in the hierarchy of legal sources.
Brimeyer, Benjamin L., Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade Organization: The 
Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance from Superpower 
Nations, 10 Minn. J. Glob. Trade 133 (2001). (2,3,6).
Contends that the WTO Dispute Settlement Process has failed to achieve compliance 
because it has yet to earn the general perception of legitimacy, both substantive and procedural.  
Queries whether available sanctions may be less onerous than reputational penalties for 
noncompliance.  Implies that international economic law may trigger sovereignty concerns that 
predispose self-interested states toward noncompliance.
Brunnée, Jutta, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and Enforcement in the Design of a Compliance 
Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 223 (2000). (1b/e, 2, 6).
Examines the negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol compliance regime.  Queries, as a 
result of the empirical evidence, whether high rates of compliance with legal regimes may be a 
function of the limited degree of behavioral modification demanded thereby and whether 
compliance with legal regimes is inversely related to the extent to which substantive 
commitments require states to depart from the conduct in which they would have engaged absent 
the regime.  Theorizes that the proper compliance strategy for any given regime is situated along 
a “persuasive continuum” stretching from purely facilitative measures at one extreme to purely 
punitive measures at the other.
Cassel, Douglass, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 
121 (2001). (1e/g/i, 2, 5).
Attributes compliance with international human rights law to multiple sources of 
causation, including the diffusion of behavioral norms and the reconstruction of individual and 
group identities around its protective principles, the incorporation of international treaties in 
domestic legal systems, and the increased availability of international and regional judicial fora 
with jurisdiction over claims of violations by states.   Suggests that the effectiveness of 
international human rights law is further affected by intervening contextual variables, such as the 
political and cultural nature of domestic governments and the relative threat to the survival of 
states at a given moment.  Concedes that it is difficult to submit this hypothesis to empirical 
testing.
Charlesworth, Hilary, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 Am. Soc’y 
Int’l L. Proc. 44 (1998). (3,5,10).
Examines the consequences of the participation of non-state actors upon the formation of 
customary international law.  Predicts a “compliance paradox” wherein the engagement of non-
state actors increases the perception of fairness in the development of custom but erodes 
consensus, weakens the normative strength of resulting legal rules, and allows state governments 
greater freedom to be selective in accepting only those legal obligations that correspond with 
9their interests.  Queries whether the participation of non-state actors in the formation of 
customary international law may ultimately erode the pursuit of justice through law.
Charney, Jonathan L., Compliance with International Soft Law, in Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International System (Dinah Shelton, ed. 
2000). (7,9).
Surveys ILC theories.  Identifies a series of variables relevant to the phenomenon of 
compliance.  Treats linkages between the norms that underlie legal regimes and a host of 
procedural, moral, and material considerations as the most relevant to explanations and 
predictions of compliance.
CHAYES, ABRAM, & CHAYES, ANTONIA, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995). (1e, 7).
Posits that states are naturally imbued with a propensity to compliance with international 
law.  Regards instances of noncompliance as exceptional and attributable not primarily to 
deliberate violation but rather to either a lack of precision in ambiguous or indeterminate treaties 
or a lack of technical capacity that prevents states willing to comply from physically doing so.  
Considers enforcement measures or sanctions an expensive “waste of time” and maintains that 
consultation, negotiation, and persuasion are sufficient to adjust preferences and steer states back 
into conformity.  Concludes that, because compliance problems are largely managerial, 
enhancement of the capacities of weaker and poorer states and organization of compliance efforts 
by powerful states willing to bear management costs are the key to enhancing the effectiveness of 
international law.
Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 Stan. J. Int’l 
L. 211 (2004). (1e/h, 2, 9).
Evaluates the success of the UN system in providing for collective security.  Suggests 
that compliance failures are often the product of a failure of domestic sovereignty in which the 
central government loses the capacity to prevent violations of law by subnational actors.  Argues 
that while the international legal regime governing collective security is not self-enforcing, state 
behaviors can be causally transformed by law to the extent that the regime is (1) perceived as 
legitimate and thus the costs associated with behavior consistent with the regime decrease 
accordingly, or (2) the regime enhances collective action and thereby decreases the costs of 
employing enforcement measures.
D’Amato, Anthony, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
1110 (1982). (1a, 3).
Suggests that the limited reach of universal judicial jurisdiction and the paralysis of the 
UN collective security system due to the exercise of veto powers hobble the effectiveness of 
sanctions, the primary coercive modality within the enforcement model of compliance.  Notes 
that the only universally effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law 
remains the traditional system of retorsion and reprisal.  Concludes that the ineffectiveness of 
enforcement suggests not that scholars and practitioners should abandon efforts to enhance 
compliance, but cautions that compliance with international human rights law is ultimately a 
matter not of law but of politics and morality.
Di Mento, Joseph F.C., Process, Norms, Compliance, and International Environmental Law, 18 
J. Envt’l L. & Litig. 251 (2003).  (1g/i, 5).
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Surveys ILC theories.  Describes a theory, labeled the “Transactional Norm Forming 
Model,” that amalgamates elements of constructivism and transnational legal process theories 
and contends that compliance is a function of the social construction of states and relevant elites 
consistent with the normative content of legal regimes as well as the degree to which these 
regimes are incorporated in domestic legal systems.  Traces the intellectual roots of the proposed 
theory.
Downs, George W., Danish, Kyle W., & Barsoom, Peter N., The Transformational Model of 
International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 465 
(2000). (1e/g/i, 2, 3, 6, 9).
Postulates that the joint transnational legal process/managerialist/constructivist, or 
“transformationalist,” premise, that weak or “soft law” regimes in which horizontal negotiation, 
cooperation and “carrots” induce states to cooperate are more effective than vertical regimes in 
which coercive enforcement measures, or “sticks,” are used to discipline noncompliers is 
demonstrably false.  Demonstrates systematic empirical support for this critical postulate by 
analysis of various environmental and arms control agreements.  Concedes the power of 
discourse and negotiation to promote interest transformation in individual and small group 
settings, but faults transformational theory for failing to develop an account for how convergence 
of interests and identities at the individual and group level percolates upward to influence the 
preferences of states.  Concludes that regimes designed consistent with the transformational 
model may actually retard compliance. 
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., & Barsoom, Peter N., Is the Good News About 
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996). (1b, 3, 6, 10).
Critiques the selection bias in managerial theory that leads to overestimation of the extent 
of compliance with international law.  Contends that compliance, particularly in issue-areas of 
high politics, is highly improbable in the absence of robust enforcement mechanisms that 
establish a deterrent regime.  Employs the concept “depth of cooperation” to examine several 
legal regimes and concludes that states may, in order to preserve the perception of compliance, 
be avoiding substantive commitments that would obligate significant behavioral transformations.
Duruigbo, Emeka, International Relations, Economics and Compliance with International Law:
Harnessing Common Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve Global Problems, 31 Cal. 
W. Int’l L.J. 177 (2001). (6,7,10).
Calls for shift from the concept of compliance to “effectiveness,” defined as the degree to 
which legal regimes effect behavioral transformations consistent with the norms underlying those 
regimes.  Suggests that the effectiveness of legal regimes is not as great as legalization theorists 
maintain.  Adopts the managerialist position that enhancement of state capacities should be a 
primary method of enhancing the effectiveness of environmental pollution prevention regimes, 
and proposes means whereby to achieve greater effectiveness of international environmental law.
Ehrmann, Markus, Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 
13  Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 377  (2002). (1e, 2, 9).
Examines the function of non-compliance procedures in several international 
environmental treaties.  Concludes that the majority of noncompliance is non-intentional and the 
consequence of technical and resource incapacities.  Eschews enforcement as costly and 
counterproductive.  Advocates a “partnership method” for managing compliance whereby 
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enhancing the capacity of noncompliers take precedence over enforcement and consultation and 
negotiation, rather than sanctions, are employed to resolve compliance disputes. 
Falk, Richard A., On Identifying and Solving the Problem of Compliance with International 
Law, 58 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 1 (1964). (5, 9).
Describes the primary epistemological problem in measuring compliance as uncertainty 
as to the specific behavioral obligation required by the legal rule in question.  Contends that 
resolution of uncertainty requires the intervention of a neutral and objective third party that can 
render an authoritative interpretation of the substantive meaning of the obligation at issue 
between parties.  Suggests that independent international law experts, provided they are not in 
service to their states of nationality, or, in the alternative, supranational institutions, negotiations, 
or the quasilegislative process of customary international legal formation can compensate for the 
deficiencies of international adjudication of compliance disputes.
Florini, Ann, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 Int’l Stud. Q. 363 (1996). (1i, 5, 7).
Defends the causal significance of norms in prompting compliance with international law.  
Surveys and critiques existing theories of ILC.  Adopts the insights of neo-Darwinism to advance 
the hypothesis that cooperative norms evolve in the manner of natural species and constitute a 
form of cultural inheritance upon which compliance can be grounded and extended.
FISHER, ROGER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981). 
(1g/k, 3, 5, 8).
Attributes responsibility for compliance with international law to the individuals at the 
apex of the state hierarchy, to whom international legal regimes are ultimately directed and upon 
whom decisions with regard to compliance ultimately rest.  Highlights the causal significance of 
religious, moral, cultural, and psychological sources of normative prescription and proscription 
to individual compliance decisions.  Regards reputational concerns, threat of enforcement, and 
reciprocal effects of compliance as theoretically significant, but considers the degree to which 
normative content reflected in international legal regimes is incorporated in domestic legislation 
and given effect in domestic courts and institutions as the most important determinants of state 
compliance.
FRANCK, THOMAS M., FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
(1995). (1h).
Posits a direct correlation between a regime’s legitimacy—defined as the widespread 
perception that its institutions arose and operate in accordance with just procedures and that its 
rules are clear and connected to principles of reason, justice, morality, or other first principles—
and compliance.  Predicts that as between two legal regimes that are equally legitimate, that 
regime with that expresses the most moral content will reap the greatest compliance.  Explains 
the evolution of legitimacy as a discursive process in which a variety of actors, including 
individuals and groups, conceive of and propound norms and exhort others to adhere to them on 
the ground that they are procedurally and substantively fair and in so doing create a transnational 
perception that legal regimes incorporating such norms are or would be legitimate.
Frischmann, Brett, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 679 
(2003). (1c/e, 2, 6).
Draws from and integrates managerial theory, enforcement theory, and more kinetic 
rational choice theories to offer a dynamic game-theoretic model hypothesizing that self-
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interested and rational states anticipate that incentives to defect from international agreements 
evolve over time and that as a consequence states plan for legal commitments to evolve in order 
to preserve positive incentives to comply while limiting the costs of enforcement.  Applies game-
theoretic models to explain empirical data concerning compliance with international 
environmental law and trade law and contends that states pursue three types of compliance 
strategies: type I (focused on adjusting states’ incentives to comply by altering payoff structures 
(the expected costs and benefits of (non)compliance),  type II (focused on facilitating cooperation 
by reducing transaction costs and uncertainty as the legal regime evolves), and type III (focused 
on maintaining cooperation and improving regime effectiveness by dynamically adjusting 
commitments over time).  Queries, albeit tacitly, whether scholars should abandon the 
development of a unified theory of ILC in favor of issue-area-specific theories.
Gerhart, Peter M., Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 357 (2000). (4,7,10).
Previews a series of symposium articles that address compliance with the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Postulates a linkage between compliance the 
substantive legitimacy of the legal rules in question.  Posits that enforcement of international 
intellectual property law is ultimately too costly standing alone and that a combination of 
modalities, including public enforcement, private enforcement, and voluntary compliance is the 
optimal strategy for enhancing effectiveness.  Suggests that the conception of international 
intellectual property law as fundamentally “Western” or capitalist stands as a barrier to the 
internalization of norms favoring voluntary compliance in underdeveloped states.
Ginsburg, Tom, & Adams, Richard H., Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229 (2004). (1e, 2, 5, 6).
Rejects the realist presumption that the international system is anarchic and presumes 
instead that states are inherently prone to coordinate, if not necessarily always to cooperate.  
Offers a game-theoretic explanation for the phenomenon of compliance with adjudicative 
decisions of international judicial fora, which lack enforcement power.  Contends that states seek 
the independent, unbiased expertise of international judicial fora in order to resolve factual 
ambiguities and preserve the prospects for future coordination.  Concludes that a general theory 
of compliance may potentially be constructed that will offer explanations and predictions across 
a broad range of issue-areas of international relations.  
Goldsmith, Jack, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 Stan. L. 
Rev. 959 (2000). (2, 3, 8, 9).
Reviews Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999).  Surveys theories 
of ILC.  Expresses realist skepticism about the independent efficacy of international law, 
particularly in relation to the use of force.  Criticizes international legal academics for 
deliberately failing to employ methodological techniques necessary to develop falsifiable 
theories.  Elaborates a series of methodological obstacles to developing and testing ILC theories 
in the path of international legal academics.
Goldsmith, Jack L., & Posner, Eric A. A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1113 (1999). (1c, 2, 3, 5).
Addresses compliance with customary international law from a rational choice 
perspective and with empirical methods.  Rejects the notion that states feel any compliance pull 
and rejects the notion that norms are significant sources of behavioral constraint.   Posits that 
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domestic courts are in effect agents whose purpose it is to implement national interests through 
their interpretation and application of customary international law.  Adopts the realist conclusion 
that law is epiphenomenal and treats compliance as the result of the convergence of state interests 
with rules.
Goldsmith, Jack L., & Posner, Eric A., International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 
44 Va. J. Int'l L. 113 (2003). (1c, 9).
Dismisses the causal significance of norms in explanations of state compliance with 
international agreements.  Regards treaties and other positive or formal sources of law as no 
more binding than, and consequently no more likely to secure compliance than, informal 
agreements.  Explains formal legalization as a means of signaling seriousness about the 
commitment to be bound by international agreements but discounts reputational considerations 
where a reputation for compliance is not inherently valuable in the given issue-are.  Argues that 
the coincidence of the self-interests of rational states is the root cause of cooperative behavior 
and identifies the convergence of interests as the key to enhancing compliance.
GOLDSMITH, JACK L., & POSNER, ERIC. A, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005).  (1c, 2, 7, 9)
Surveys and critiques ILC theories. Explains compliance with international law as the 
choice of rational states that maximizes their interests in the accumulation of power or other 
goods.  Tests a comprehensive theory of international law with empirical evidence across a range 
of issue-areas, including human rights and trade, and offers normative prescriptions on the basis 
of findings. 
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 1 (2004). (1f/i/k, 2, 7, 8, 9).
Argues that states are susceptible to socialization designed to encourage them to embrace 
and comply with normative requirements in the issue-area of human rights.  Differentiates a 
program of normative “acculturation” from earlier constructivist theories.  Distinguishes 
coercion and persuasion, the two most common implementation mechanisms, from acculturation 
and describes how a program that mobilizes social and cultural pressures can lead states to 
conform their conduct.  Specifies some of the psychological microprocesses through which 
acculturation reconstructs individual and ultimately state identities and preferences. 
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 13 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 171 (2002). (2, 7, 9).
Critiques the hypothesis that increased legalization may correlate with decreased 
compliance.  Surveys existing ILC theories.  Defines the central empirical project within ILC as 
the identification of the necessary conditions for the domestic incorporation of international 
norms into state practice.  Cautions against the use of traditional quantitative methods of theory 
generation and testing, such as multivariate statistics, given the state of the discipline and the 
paucity of data.
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1749 (2003). (1i/j, 2, 6)
Interrogates the hypothesis that a distinction must be drawn between high politics and 
low politics in respect to state propensities to comply with international legal regulation, with 
effects most pronounced in the issue-area of national security.  Examines the organizational-
14
cultural approach to explaining the transnational tendencies of national military bureaucracies to 
eschew particular methods and means of warfare even where such methods and means are not 
unlawful.  Concludes that states are socially constructed by the preferences of national military 
bureaucracies, that these preferences are organized at the international level, and that even in the 
issue-area of national security states can be socialized to comply with legal rules that tap these 
common normative preferences.
Greenwood, Christopher, Ensuring Compliance with International Law, in Control Over 
Compliance with International Law (W.E. Butler, ed. 1991). (1b/k, 3, 6).
Identifies failures of compliance with the laws of war as emanating from three causes: 1) 
the lack of discipline or pathology of individual soldiers, 2) deliberate state policies intended to 
gain strategic advantage over enemy states, and 3) lack of clarity as to the substantive content of 
the legal rules.  Regards the threat of reprisal as the most potent force for ensuring compliance 
with the laws of war, with reputational concerns and normative commitments as far less 
significant sources of restraint.  Treats armed conflict as qualitatively different in terms of 
regulability from other issue-areas of law.
Guzman, Andrew T., A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 
(2002). (1f, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys existing theories of compliance.  Rejects the theoretical significance of substate 
levels of analysis and presumes that states are self-interested unitary actors.  Contends that states 
comply with international law in order to develop and preserve the benefits of a reputation for 
compliance and that the potential compliance is thus, to some degree, bounded by the importance 
of reputation within particular issue-areas of international relations.  Concedes that reputation is 
less important in issue-areas of “high politics,” such as armed conflict, arms control, and 
territory, than in issue-areas of “low politics,” such as economics and environmental protection.  
States that future ILC research should concentrate within issue-areas in which reputation matters. 
Haas, Peter M., Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative 
Politics, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
System (Dinah Shelton, ed. 2000). (2, 5, 7, 9).
Surveys ILC theories and describes the state of knowledge regarding international legal 
compliance as underdeveloped and undertheorized.  Enumerates epistemological and 
methodological problems in evaluating compliance, including problems in conceptualizing 
compliance, false reporting, unintentional noncompliance.  Describes methodological tools 
whereby the study of compliance can be systematized, including process tracing, aggregate 
analysis of treaties, multivariate analysis, and counterfactual studies.  Suggests that the primary 
impediment to compliance is the unwillingness of states to pay the political costs to discipline 
self-interested elements of domestic polities for whom compliance runs counter to their interests.
Haas, Peter M., Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in International 
Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (1d, 5, 7, 9).
Describes methodological issues in measuring compliance and demands that ILC theories 
be supported by empirical evidence.  Surveys ILC theories to map the contours of the ILC field 
and sketch a research agenda.  Postulates an institutionalist theory that suggests that wealthy 
liberal democratic states may be simultaneously more capable of complying and more 
domestically responsive to the preferences of individuals and groups who desire compliance; 
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thus, wealthy liberal democratic states are systematically more likely to comply than poorer, 
illiberal states.
Handl, Günther, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations, 
5 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 29 (1997). (6, 10).
Hypothesizes that state interests in ensuring compliance are directly proportional to the 
complexity of an international legal regime and the costs of complying.  Emphasizes that in 
multilateral treaties state practice of parties can have the effect of modifying international legal 
obligation, making it still more difficult to evaluate compliance.  Advocates semi-formal peer 
review procedures whereby parties to multilateral conventions can convene to specify 
obligations, establish more transparent procedures for determining compliance, and “fine-tune” 
enforcement measures.
Hathaway, Oona, Between Power and Principle: A Political Theory of International Law, 71 U. 
Chi.
L. Rev. _ (2005). (1c/f,  2, 5, 7, 9).
Classifies ILC literature into rational actor and normative models and surveys their primary 
hypotheses.  Analyzes empirical evidence of state practice under human rights and environmental 
treaties.  Synthesizes key elements of rational choice and reputational theories and concludes that 
state compliance decisions are shaped by the legal incentives engendered by domestic and 
transnational enforcement of international law as well as by the nonlegal incentives created by 
the reactions of external political actors in response to state compliance decisions.  Offers 
suggestions for future research in the ILC subfield.
Hathaway, Oona, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). 
(1c/f,
2, 6, 7, 9).
Surveys existing ILC theories.  Notes the methodological unsophistication of 
international legal scholarship and advocates introduction of empirical methods to harden the 
discipline.  Conducts quantitative investigation of compliance human rights treaties and 
concludes that, although external normative pressures are successful in inducing state accessions, 
state behavior is largely unaffected by legalization because a lack of effective monitoring and 
enforcement erodes any incentives for self-interested states to modify conduct to meet treaty 
obligations. 
HENKIN, LOUIS, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (1967). (5, 7, 8). 
Initiates the first major investigation of the phenomenon of compliance with international 
law.  Begins the development of a multivariate explanation for compliance that incorporates 
variables from several levels of analysis, notably national values and cultural traditions regarding 
attitudes toward law and authority and attributes of the political personalities of individual 
decisionmakers who wield state power.  Concludes that compliance with international law is the 
rule rather than the exception and that the most fruitful method of enhancing compliance is likely 
to be the fostering of domestic cultures of compliance.
Ho, Daniel E., Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle 
Accord?, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 647 (2002). (1f, 2, 5, 9).
Highlights the lack of empirical research in the ILC subfield and notes that selection bias 
erodes the significance of available studies.  Challenges the liberalist premise that democracies 
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are inherently more compliant with international law and counters that democratic regimes are
more corrupt and more fragmented domestically and consequently less likely to comply than 
nondemocratic states.  Argues instead that reputational concerns are central to the establishment 
of compliance with “soft law” regimes and that a reputation for compliance confers benefits in 
the form of a “stamp of approval” that other states recognize as an indicator of business 
worthiness. 
Huang, Peter H., International Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 237 (2002). 
(1c/f, 2, 6, 8).
Complements rational choice theory by considering that actors are motivated by a desire 
to preserve their reputations.  Suggests that preferences in favor of legal compliance can be 
induced by law in the sense that law modifies decisional strategies.  Posits that compliance 
behavior in the issue-area of international environmental law can be molded and create self-
enforcing expectations that reduce the need for enforcement.  Models a reputational theory of 
international environmental law.
IWASAWA, YUJI, EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIIONAL LAW, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW (1998). (2, 3, 5).
Explains slow pace of Japanese domestic incorporation of human rights norms in terms of 
a traditional and homogenous culture resistant to wholesale important of external concepts.  
Suggests that engagement of human rights NGOs has been important to political transformation 
but has not has similar influence on courts due to the dualist nature of the Japanese legal system.  
Indirectly calls into question whether transnational legal processes are universally effective in 
enhancing compliance.
Jacobson, Harold K., Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying 
Compliance, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 569 (1998). (7, 9).
Surveys major ILC theories while noting and offering an account for the 
underdevelopment of the field of ILC.  Distinguishes high politics from low politics and suggests 
that knowledge is likely to remain more limited in issue-areas where obligations are less clear, 
such as in the case of customary international law, or in the case of newer sources of law.  Calls 
on legal and international relations scholars to jointly commit more resources to empirical study 
and to the empirical description of compliance patterns as a necessary precondition to more bold 
theorization. 
Janis, Mark W., The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 Conn. J. Int'l L. 39 (2000). (5, 8, 9).
Conflates compliance and effectiveness.  Outlines the methdological and epistemological 
difficulties in evaluating compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, most crucially the lack of access to complete data and the 
difficulty in evaluating partial compliance. Proposes that the increased efficacy of “Strasbourg” 
law can be inferred from the growth in the membership of states parties to the European 
Convention and from the fact that disputes are submitted for judicial review.  Concedes that the 
ultimate determinant of compliance may be the perception of legitimacy of a given legal regime,
and recognizes that legitimacy is a subjective assessment not susceptible to determination 
through legal, as opposed to psychological, analysis.
Joyner, Christopher C., Compliance and Enforcement in New International Fisheries Law, 12 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 271 (1998). (5, 10).
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Distinguishes compliance from effectiveness and suggests that a high rate of compliance 
may be an indication that the legal regime in question obligates little change in state behavior or 
is so open to interpretation that any conduct can be described as compliant.  Examines 
multilateral treaties regulating commercial fishing and contends that for legal regimes to be 
effective they must require conduct that is congruent with the self-interest of member-states.  
Further argues that enforcement of international law is dependent not upon threats of sanctions 
but upon the deployment of positive incentives sufficient to motivate states to comply and to 
prosecute noncompliant nationals.
Joyner, Christopher C., Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening 
Compliance with Soft International Law 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 401 (1998). (2, 9).
Counters the perception of “soft law” as insufficient to generate state compliance.  
Surveys the history of state practice under the Antarctic Treaty and concludes that soft law 
enables states to reach more precise agreements than might be possible in “hard law” format, that 
state compliance with soft law agreements is better than expected, and that soft law agreements 
form the customary law nucleus for future binding obligations.
Joyner, Christopher C., Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United 
Nations’ Experience Against Iraq, 32 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1991). (2).
Links the effectiveness of the enforcement model to the transparency of the underlying 
norms for the violation of which sanctions are imposed, the speed with which enforcement is 
undertaken, the comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, and the willingness of powerful 
states to make material contributions to the success of enforcement.  Considers the UN system to 
be an important site for maximizing the perception of legitimacy of resulting enforcement 
measures.
KECK, MARGARET F., & SIKKINK, KATHRYN, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS (1998). 
(1i, 5, 8).
Criticizes liberalism as undertheorized in regard to the process whereby individuals and 
groups acquire their preferences regarding international legal compliance.  Rejects the centrality 
of the state to explanations of contemporary international relations.  Theorizes that transnational 
epistemic communities consisting of uniquely situated individuals and groups highly committed 
to normative programs organize within issue-areas and diffuse their influence across national 
boundaries through a combination of persuasion, socialization, and electoral pressure.  Attributes 
state compliance preferences and behavior to the influence of these epistemic communities and 
ascribes the evolution of norms, and compliance with these norms, to the effects of the process 
whereby states and their preferences are socially constructed. 
Kelly, Claire R., Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 36 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. _ (2004). 
(1e/g, 2 6).
Builds upon transnational legal process and managerial theories and attributes compliance 
to the phenomenon described as “enmeshment,” which occurs when a state finds that its interests 
and the substantive rules of an international legal regime are closely related.  Differentiates 
between issue-areas and suggests that the greatest likelihood that a state will become enmeshed 
in a particular international legal regime exists in issue-areas of low politics.  Concludes that 
harnessing the capacity of enmeshment to enhance regime effectiveness requires a high degree of 
formalization—i.e, the treaty language must be as precise as parties will tolerate.
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Kelly, Claire R., The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative 
Feedback Loop, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 673 (2001). (1d/i, 2, 5, 7).
Theorizes that self-enforcing regimes—treaties that create organs with powers to impose 
direct sanctions on non-compliers—may, by bypassing domestic sites of normative interpretation 
and national identity and interest assertion, create negative consequences for compliance.  
Suggests that enhancing compliance may require that this “normative feedback loop” be 
reintegrated into the functioning of self-enforcing regimes by creating exemptions from the 
operation of legal rules or allowing non-state actors that would normally participate in the 
domestic interpretive process greater opportunities to introduce national constituency preferences 
into international value and identity formation.  Proposes a modified constructivist theory that 
explains compliance with self-enforcing regimes as a function of the degree to which the 
normative feedback loop is reintegrated and national constituencies are allowed to construct 
shared expectations and understandings of the rules that constitute international law.
Kelly, Claire R., Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 545 (2004). (1c, 2, 7).
Modifies the realist premise that legal rules are epiphenomenal to state practice by 
positing that as states become “enmeshed” in legal regimes they come to rely upon the benefits 
of regime membership, which cumulatively outweigh the costs of compliance even in individual 
“hard cases.”  Suggests that legal regimes themselves develop causal significance in explaining 
and predicting compliance even within the realist account of international relations and 
international law.  Supports this modified realist argument with empirical examples from a series 
of regimes, including the EU, WTO, Law of the Sea Convention, IMF, and International 
Criminal Court.
Keohane, Robert O., Compliance With International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework 
of Law, 86 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 176 (1992). (2, 7, 9).
Suggests that empirical studies of compliance might treat compliance decisions as the 
dependent variable and the relative power of state, the nature of international institutions, the 
clarity of legal obligations, the strength of underlying norms, and linkages to domestic 
considerations as independent variables.  Surveys ILC theories.  Notes that building and testing 
theories requires the synthesis of the methods of international law and international relations—
the determination of whether compliance has occurred requires legal judgment, while the 
analysis of causal relationships between rules and behaviors requires the resort to social scientific 
methods.
Keohane, Robert O.  International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv. J. Int’l 
L. 487 (1997). (5, 7, 9).
Bifurcates ILC into “instrumentalist” and “normative optics, with the former consisting 
of a cluster of realist, rational choice, and enforcement theories skeptical about the significance 
of norms in fostering rule-governed cooperation, and the latter a cluster of liberal, legal process, 
managerial, reputational, and constructivist theories that regard norms as having a causal effect 
upon state behaviors and as capable of exerting a “pull” toward compliance.  Critiques both 
optics.  Regards policy elites as crucial players in establishing and maintaining compliance.  
Elaborates an agenda for future interdisciplinary research.
Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 (1998). (7, 9, 10).
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Challenges the notion of compliance as the mere correspondence of behavior with legal 
rules and argues for the concept of “effectiveness” as the benchmark of legal regimes.  Surveys 
existing theories of ILC, including realism, liberalism, constructivism, managerialism, and 
transnational legal process.  Cautions against empirical research that fails to account for causes 
and effects of legal rules, and warns against purely positivist theories that ignore considerations 
of justice and morality.
Knop, Karen, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 501 (2000). (1g, 2, 5, 10).
Calls for a more nuanced understanding of the role of domestic courts as agents in the 
enforcement of international law.  Suggests that domestic courts, because they regard 
international law as persuasive, and not binding, authority, ultimately transform and heterogenize 
international law.  Implies that the enforcement model of international legal compliance that 
relies on domestic courts, or “transjudicialism,” must either make room for variations in the 
degree and direction of compliance across states or else give way to international judicial fora.
Knox, John H., A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The 
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 Ecology L.Q. 1  (2001). 
(2, 7).
Contends that the role of international adjudication in promoting compliance with 
international environmental law is limited, in significant part because states are unwilling to 
jeopardize relations with other states by bringing claims against them.  Examines the function of 
various international regimes that permit non-governmental organizations and/or individuals to 
trigger judicial review.  Concludes that permitting non-state actors and other private parties to 
bring claims before international judicial tribunals or less formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
will enhance the effectiveness of the managerial model of compliance by creating a more 
factually complete and less confrontational environment.
Koh, Harold, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996). (1g, 5, 10).
Surveys ILC theories.  Maintains that the key actors in compliance are not just states, as 
realism postulates, but also nongovernmental organizations, institutions, and individuals.  
Hypothesizes that repetitive interactions within transnational epistemic communities consisting 
largely of foreign policy elites give rise to norms favoring cooperation and that the 
internalization of these norms in domestic law and legal institutions fosters the progressive 
evolution of rule-governed cooperation.  Suggests that states can be induced not merely toward 
compliance but into obedience, defined as voluntary compliance in the absence of sanctions.
Koh, Harold, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997). (1g, 2, 5, 7).
Divides ILC field into two camps, the first comprised of managerialist and transnational 
legal process theories and dedicated to the defense of the premises that international law is really 
law and that states generally comply, and the second populated by realists and rational choice 
theorists skeptical of the causal significance of international law.  Surveys the origins and 
development of international law and elaborates the Chayes’ managerial theory and Franck’s 
legitimacy theory.  Presents and heuristically tests transnational legal process theory, which 
postulates that repetitive interactions within transnational epistemic communities consisting 
largely of foreign policy elites give rise to norms favoring cooperation and that the 
internalization of these norms in domestic law and legal institutions fosters the progressive 
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evolution of rule-governed cooperation.  Concludes that states can be socialized toward 
obedience, and not merely to enhanced compliance.
Koskenniemi, Martii, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1947 (1990). (1g, 5).
Contends that non-legal sources of behavioral prescription and proscription exert greater 
influence upon states than do legal sources.  Stresses the importance of norm inculcation within 
domestic legal regimes to the promotion of compliance.
KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH V., RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989). (2, 3, 5, 7, 9).
Describes international law circa 1989 as a primitive legal system and attributes primary 
importance to domestic legal systems in regard to the enforcement of international legal norms.  
Conceptualizes noncompliance with international legal norms as not an act of lawlessness but 
rather as a gambit to transform, or bargain for the transformation of, norms and rules.  Cautions 
that attempts to enforce compliance through coercive measures are bound to fail and urges 
scholars to fashion alternative methods.
Ku, Julian G., The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with 
International Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 457 (2004). (5).
Critiques the “nationalist” conception of international relations, which assumes the 
exclusion of States, and advances a revisionist model in which States, as general sovereigns, play 
an important role in the interpretation of customary international law, in the implementation of 
non-self-executing treaties, and in the administration of private international law more generally.  
Situates the primary locus of compliance with international law in the constituent States of the 
United States, and in particular in State courts and legislatures.  Suggest that domestic legislation 
may be more effective in promoting compliance.  Concludes that affording a broader to the 
States in the implementation of international law may better comport with traditional notions of 
federalism while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of international law.
Leary, Virginia A., Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in International Compliance with 
Nonbinding Accord (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (9, 10).
Argues that “compliance” is too narrow an approach to the study of the relationship of 
nonbinding norms to state behavior and that the concept of “influence” is more appropriate to the 
analysis of “soft law.”  Admits the difficulty in measuring the influence of soft law due to the 
limited dissemination of its normative pronouncements, particularly in the field of international 
labor law.  Suggests that the translation of soft law into customary international law may 
promote their effectiveness, but notes that this hypothesis is not yet supported by empirical 
research.
Levit, Janet Koven, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or 
Promise?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 281 (1999). (1g, 2, 5).
Surveys ILC theories.  Adopts the transnational legal process premise that the 
internalization of international rules and norms within the domestic legal systems of states is the 
most propitious avenue toward compliance.  Examines the constitutionalization strategy 
employed by the Argentine legal system and attributes compliance failures to knowledge deficits 
rather than deliberate inaction.  Concludes, consistent with constructivist theory, that epistemic 
communities of human rights activists are essential to the support of internalization strategies and 
ultimately to compliance.
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Levit, Janet Koven, the Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement 
on Officially Supported Export Credits, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 65 (2004). (2, 7, 9).
Examines empirical data concerning the the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially 
Supported Export Credits—a soft-law framework for cooperation in the international trade and 
finance issue-area—and explains a systematic pattern of compliance as a function of the 
flexibility, pragmatism, and consensus-based participatory decision-making procedures of the 
Arrangement.  Suggests that narrow rational choice accounts of state compliance are belied by 
evidence suggesting that states continue to cooperate even in the absence of short-term benefits 
not merely because they desire the longer-term benefits of cooperation but because participation 
in the regime restructures their preferences and their identities, through a dynamic and interactive 
process, to create inherent interests in compliance and in membership in a social community 
committed to incrementally strengthening regime norms.  Concludes that explanations of the 
Arrangement and of the importance of legal rules to the establishment and effectiveness of other 
soft-law agreements require integration of reputational and managerial theories.
Louka, Elli.  Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only 
About the Protection of the Environment, 10 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 79 (1996). (1e, 5).
Attributes failure of enforcement mechanisms to create compliance with international 
environmental law to the inadequacy of resources.  Suggests that the key to promoting 
compliance lies in the nurturing of transnational norm-generating communities that inculcate 
norms more deeply into state decisionmaking and the institution of domestic incentives that 
reward cooperative behavior.  Concludes that the deepest cooperation requires iterative, state-to-
state negotiation and the reconstruction and convergence of national identities.
March, James G., & Olsen, Johan P., The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders, 52 Int’l Org. 943 (1998). (1d/i/k, 7, 8, 9).
Articulates a theory of “new institutionalism” that hypothesizes that the development of 
transnational networks of domestic bureaucracies, courts, and administrative agencies, along 
with the officials who staff them, are becoming the primary agents for the promulgation of new 
normative and legal regulations.  Rejects the “logic of consequences,” which regards compliance 
behaviors as the result of the rational calculation and pursuit of interests, whether by individuals, 
organizations, or states, in favor of a “logic of appropriateness,” which suggests that compliance 
behavior, along with the identities, rules, and institutions that are theoretically significant in the 
explanation of international relations more generally, is shaped by social and moral norms that 
causally influence individual preferences.  Describes points of intersection between the two 
logics and concludes that the complexity of international relations is such that theoretical islands, 
rather than a meta-theory, should be the focus of ILC scholars.
Mearsheimer, John J., The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 Int’l Sec. Rev. 5 
(1995). (1a, 3).
Rejects the causal significance of law in relation to state behaviors.  Contends that states 
make decisions regarding compliance with international law solely in terms of whether 
compliance will tilt the balance of power in their favor.  Argues that empirical evidence lends 
little or no support to the proposition that cooperation can be built and sustained upon a 
normative foundation.
Mitchell, Ronald, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in Improving Compliance with 
International Law (James Cameron Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick, eds. 1996). (7, 9, 10).
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Surveys ILC theories.  Links sources of compliance failures to issues of faulty regime 
design.  Resists the tendency to equate state behavior consistent with legal rules with compliance 
and argues that claims regarding the effectiveness of legal regimes must be subjected to 
empirical analysis.
Moore, David H., A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 879 
(2003). (1c/f, 2).
Challenges the legalist assertion that compliance is the rule rather than the exception.  
Surveys and briefly critiques existing theories.  Supplements rational choice theories by 
propounding a signaling theory” that explains compliance with human rights treaties even in the 
absence of pressure as a strategy intended to maintain and enhance status within a highly 
interrelated community of states.
Moore, John Norton, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 
Va. J. Int’l L. 881 (1999). (3, 6).
Cautions that too much scholarly attention is focused on the continuing refinement and 
promulgation of international legal regimes and too little upon compliance, the “greatest 
challenge for the future of international law[.]”  Queries whether high politics issue-areas may be 
less regulable through law than issue-areas of low politics.  Contends that informal political 
measures, such as reprisal or reciprocal conduct, may be more effective in promoting long-term 
compliance than formal institutional mechanisms.
Morrow, James D., The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International 
Politics, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 41 (2002). (1b, 2, 3, 6).
Undertakes empirical analysis of compliance with the laws of war and concludes that 
compliance can be secured only through voluntarism or through effective enforcement measures.  
Treats states as the relevant level of analysis.  Operationalizes the laws of war as a series of 
prescription and proscriptions with regard to particular “battle strategies” and offers a rational 
choice explanation of compliance and noncompliance as self-interested calculations of the 
benefits and costs of electing particular battle strategies.  Predicts noncompliance when the 
benefits are greater than the associated costs imposed in reprisal.  Suggests that the capacity of 
law to regulate state behavior in the issue-area of armed conflict may be more limited than in 
other issue-areas.
Nakagawa, Junji, Securing Compliance in Traditional and Contemporary International Law: A 
Theoretical Analysis, in Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From Theory into 
Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (2, 4, 9).
Examines trends in ILC and notes a theoretically significant shift toward nontraditional 
methods of enhancing compliance, including soft law and third-party dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Notes further that the proliferation of non-state actors and non-European states as 
subjects and authors of international law may imposes duties to comply upon actors that lack the 
capacity to comply with legal regimes.  Suggests that non-binding regimes that subject disputes 
over compliance to neutral institutions and seek to induce compliance through positive 
incentives, rather than through coercion, may be the path to enhancing the efficiency of 
international law.
O’Brien, William V., Teaching Humanitarian Law in Universities and Law Schools, 31 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1011 (1982). (3, 6).
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Recognizes the fragility of the legal regime governing the laws of war in relation to state 
sovereignty and the imperatives of security.  Challenges the orthodox view that reprisal is the 
sole method for ensuring compliance with the laws of war.  Concludes that the norms underlying 
the laws of war are so fundamental to the maintenance of international order and justice that 
states must be willing to refrain from reprisal and submit violations to judicial determination if 
these normative principles are to be protected and promoted.
O’Connell , Mary Ellen, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law, 3 
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 47 (1995). (1g, 5).
Argues that compliance with international environmental law is the rule rather than the 
exception and that most compliance is voluntary in nature.  Rejects enforcement, whether 
through formal international legal institutions or informal reprisals, as a means of enhancing 
compliance due to a host of limiting factors, including an absence of jurisdiction or the inability 
to impose effective sanctions for violations.  Posits that domestic courts may prove the most 
effective means of securing compliance with international environmental law if doctrinal and 
political obstacles to adjudication of claims, such as standing, forum non conveniens, and 
sovereign immunity, can be reduced.
Okuwaki, Naoya, The Changing Nature of International Obligations: Can Voluntary Compliance 
Overcome the Difficulties in the Present Nation-State System?, in Trilateral Perspectives on 
International Legal Issues: From Theory into Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia 
Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (2, 4, 9, 10).
Stresses that proper empirical measurement of the effectiveness of a legal regime requires 
distinguishing lex ferenda from crystallized international legal obligations.  Distinguishes 
effectiveness, measured as changes in state behaviors caused by the rules of legal regimes, from 
compliance, measured as the mere correspondence of behaviors and rules.  Suggests that the 
most difficult obstacle facing legal architects is the re-negotiation of the normative content of 
existing legal regimes, and of customary international law, to take into consideration the 
divergent normative preferences of non-Western states that did not participate equally in the 
formation of these regimes.
Posner, Eric, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (2003). (1c, 2, 3).
Develops a rational choice theory of compliance that explains the laws of war as a pre-
war agreement to abstain from enumerated “battle strategies” and predicts that states will comply 
with rules that limit the resort to particular methods or means only if the benefits gained through 
the resort to these methods or means are less than the sanction costs imposed by other states in 
reprisal.  Expresses skepticism that states will generally comply with the laws of war.  Calls for 
more empiricism and greater parsimony in ILC.
Posner, Richard A., Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31 
J. Leg. Stud. 321 (2002). (1c, 3, 7).
Surveys some initial applications of rational choice theory to ILC.  Assumes that state 
behavior is essentially identical to that of individuals, who are further presumed to be rational 
actors in that they are self-interested and make conscious welfare-maximizing choices.  Rejects 
the theoretical relevance of substate levels of analysis.  Challenges the premise of reputational 
theory that reputation is unitary and that states have a single reputation across issue-areas.  
Discounts the significance of norms as a basis for building and maintaining compliance with 
international law.
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Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 81 (1991). 
(3, 4).
Presents a critical legal studies theory of international law that rejects the primacy of 
states in the international system, disputes the liberal notion that an objective moral consensus 
regarding justice is possible, and challenges the determinacy of international legal obligations.  
Suggests that compliance may not in fact be possible given the utter indeterminacy and 
incoherence of international law.
Ratner, Steven R., Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol. 591 (2000). (1g/k, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Queries whether international law can expect to secure compliance in cases of ethnic 
conflict and human rights issues and concludes in the affirmative.  Surveys and organizes ILC 
field into normative and positive theoretical clusters.  Analyzes the functions of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and suggests that because they fail to operationalize “soft law” norms existing theories 
are unable to explain significant forces that induce compliance with emerging, if uncodified, 
sources of behavioral regulation.  Articulates a “mediation theory” which postulates that 
individuals are relevant actors in international relations and that certain high-status normative 
“intermediaries” can play theoretically significant roles in promoting compliance.
Ratner, Steven R., Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human Dignity in Times of Crisis: On 
the Possibilities for Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5 Theoretical Inq. L. 81 (2004). (1i, 6).
Differentiates the prospects for nurturing compliance in regard to issue-areas of high 
politics and low politics.  Describes the dilemma for states facing grave crises in which the only 
alternatives appear to be noncompliance with legal regimes, particularly human rights or 
humanitarian law, or willing acceptance of national catastrophe.  Suggests that compliance may 
be possible even during crises and national emergencies provided states can be induced, before 
the crises or emergencies arise and fundamentally transform attitudes regarding compliance, to 
“tie their own hands” through precommitments to restraint. 
Ratner, Steven R., Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 
Tex. L. Rev. 2055 (2003). (1f/g, 5).
Extends domestic constitutional law “precommitment theory” into the realm of 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  Notes that some states enter into international 
treaties either without the intent to comply or solely to secure reciprocity or the benefits of 
association, and not on the basis of agreement with underlying norms.  Builds upon reputational 
and signaling theories and suggests that the seemingly related questions of why states “bind their 
hands” in advance of future temptations to engage in specific conduct by entering into 
international legal obligations and why states comply may be entirely separate lines of inquiry.  
Raustiala, Kal, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and 
the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (2002). (1i, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys ILC theories to assess the influence of informal transnational linkages between 
state officials upon compliance.  Draws empirical support from state practice for the proposition 
that realism, managerialism, and transnational legal process theory each imply a positive role for 
these transgovernmental networks in enhancing compliance with treaties and with less formal 
transnational agreements.  Concludes that, particularly in issue-areas of great complexity and in 
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regard to low politics, transgovernmental networks will increasingly come to substitute for 
treaties as the modality whereby to coordinate cooperation and that scholars must retool existing 
ILC theories to adapt to this transformation. 
Raustiala, Kal, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case 
W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2000). (2, 7, 9, 10)
Reorients focus from compliance to effectiveness as the better gauge of the function of 
legal regimes to modify state behavior toward norm-governed cooperation.  Surveys existing ILC 
theories in three baskets: rationalism, normativism, and liberalism.  Evaluates studies to 
heuristically test the effectiveness of international environmental treaties.  Concludes that an 
empirical and multidisciplinary approach that draws upon the insights of international relations 
theories is required if international legal regimes are ultimately to be rendered more effective.
Saunders, Phillip M., Development Cooperation and Compliance with International 
Environmental Law: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in Trilateral Perspectives on 
International Legal Issues: From Theory into Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia 
Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (1e, 3).
Identifies the proliferation of soft law agreements, in which states seek to express 
normative commitments without accepting legal limitations on their sovereignty, as a principle 
impediment to compliance.  Notes that the complexity of many recent international legal 
regimes, coupled with the implementation costs such regimes impose upon members, further 
weaken the prospects for compliance.  Expresses skepticism about the prospects for compliance 
but stresses that financial and technical assistance to underdeveloped states is an imperative if 
compliance, particularly with international environmental law, is to advance. 
Setear, John K., An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations 
Theory and International Law, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139 (1996). (1c/e, 2).
Examines several arms control agreements to support a theory that draws from 
managerialism and rational choice theory and posits that treaty parties are in an iterative 
relationship in which they learn over time deepen the natural and rational propensity to 
cooperate.  Suggests that by developing rules and procedures to make the rational preference for 
cooperation more effective, states produce long-term public gains.  Concludes that obligations 
will gradually increase over time as the depth of cooperation evolves and that compliance is a 
rational outcome.
Scott, Shirley V., The Impact on International Law of U.S. Noncompliance, in United States 
Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte, eds. 2003). 
(2, 9).
Suggests that the indeterminacy of international law is such that the concept of 
compliance is inadequate to the development and testing of theories, and notes that many 
states—not just the U.S.—have mixed records of compliance.  Concludes that the absence of a 
clear distinction between legal and illegal behavior in many issue-areas of law introduces 
methodological difficulties into the field of ILC.  Suggests that mitigation of methodological 
difficulties may require the selection of cases about which a consensus can be reached regarding 
the facts of compliance or noncompliance.  
Shelton, Dinah, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in International 
Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (9,10).
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Distinguishes the study of compliance of “soft law,” or nonbinding declarations of norms, 
from treaty-based international legal obligations.  Disputes the managerialist assertion that 
compliance cannot be measured empirically.  Recognizes the heightened difficulty in 
operationalizing soft law compliance and in acquiring, evaluating, and scoring compliance data.  
Concedes that establishing causality between soft law rules and behaviors is particularly difficult 
and potentially beyond the methodological capacity of the discipline. 
Shen, Jianming, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 Dick. J. Int’l L. 287 
(1999). (1h, 7).
Develops an ILC taxonomy that divides the field in naturalist and positivist theories and 
their variants.  Enumerates several theoretically significant variables to the explanation and 
prediction of state compliance, including national-cultural attitudes toward law and legal 
authority, the salience of reputation in the personal calculus of head decisionmakers, and the 
likelihood of sanctions or reprisals in the event of noncompliance.  Concludes that compliance is 
the inherent preference of states because the very existence of law creates a normative force that 
impels them toward compliance.
Shihata, Ibrahim F. I., Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements—Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank’s Experience, 9 
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 37 (1996). (2).
Embraces the managerialist hypothesis that attributes compliance failures to a lack of 
technical capacity.  Generalizes from the World Bank experience to suggest that enforcement 
measures are ill-suited to enhancing compliance with international environmental law.  
Recommends packages of technical support and transnational dispute resolution mechanisms to 
enable states to harmonize interests and expectations and thereby enhance compliance.
Simmons, Beth A.  Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes, 46 Confl. Resolution 829 (2002). (1c/f, 2, 6, 9).
Contends that rational, self-interested states enter into international legal agreements to 
achieve outcomes and reap gains not available through independent action or informal 
negotiation alone.  Argues further that the mere existence of legally binding rules are causally 
significant in transforming state preferences and decisions, even in regard to issue-areas of high 
politics such as territory, because rules impose costs upon decisions not to comply.  Predicts that 
as operant norms diffuse and solidify, reputational costs associated with noncompliance rise 
along with the prospects for compliance.
Simmons, Beth A., International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection 
of Principles and Politics, 95 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 271 (2001). (2, 3, 6, 9).
Laments the shallowness of interdisciplinary collaboration between international law and 
international relations in the investigation of the phenomenon of compliance.  Describes the 
skepticism of international legal scholars at the proposition that legal rules can be operationalized 
as variables and integrated into theoretical models that in turn can be tested with the assistance of 
social science methodologies.  Suggests that if interdisciplinary collaborations continue to find 
that law exerts no or little independent causal influence upon state compliance behaviors the 
likelihood of future collaboration within the ILC field will diminish.
Simmons, Beth A, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of 
Money?, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 323 (2000). (1c/f, 2, 7, 9).
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Conceptualizes international financial law as a signaling device used by states-parties to 
relevant treaties designed to demonstrate “good citizenship” to markets and other states and in 
turn to reap the associated benefits of trade and investment.  Surveys and faults much of the 
literature in ILC for methodological and epistemological shortcomings, including lack of 
sufficient rigor and an absence of empiricism. Explains and predicts compliance as the strategy 
to preserve these reputational benefits, and concludes that those states most sensitive to 
reputational effects will be most likely to comply.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503 
(1995). (1d, 5, 7).
Posits that the key actors in regard to compliance are not states but rather individuals, 
institutions, organizations, and other components of civil society.  Contends that it is the nature 
of the domestic politics that predominate within state borders that determines the composition of 
representative governments and in turn the willingness of states to subordinate sovereignty to 
normative, and thus legal, regulation.  Theorizes that liberal democracies are inherently more 
committed to the “rule of law,” more prone to absorb international legal obligations into their 
domestic legal orders and to diffuse these obligations through foreign policy bureaucracies, and 
more willing to permit interest groups to mobilize mass electoral support for international legal 
norms than non-democratic states.  Explains and predicts compliance as a function of the degree 
to which the aggregation of the preferences of key domestic individuals and groups directs the 
representative state toward norm-following and legal regulation.
SLAUGHTER, ANNE-MARIE, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). (5, 7).
Describes transnational government networks—informal linkages between counterpart 
state officials that transcend national boundaries—as important resources for enhancing capacity 
for compliance and building upon the natural propensity of states toward voluntary compliance.  
Suggests further that by disseminating administrative resources and information, government 
networks reinforce cooperative norms and strengthen the international rule of law.  
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, & Raustiala, Kal, in Handbook of International Relations (W. Carlsnaes, 
T. Risse, & B.A. Simmons, eds. 2002). (7, 9, 10).
Conceptualizes the field of ILC and surveys existing theories.  Traces the intellectual 
history of ILC.  Sketches a research agenda.
Smith, Edwin M., Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1549 (1991). (1c, 2).
Builds upon dynamic theories of cooperation and iterated game theory to develop a 
rational choice account that explains arms control agreements as the result of self-interested 
states learning to cooperate and jointly share the relative gains available through compliance with 
gradually evolving legal regimes.  Suggests that treaties are but a part of a broader pattern of 
nonlegal relationships between parties and that formal institutions are unnecessary to support 
compliance, as parties value and desire to maintain and improve this relational pattern and 
converged expectations and the informal mechanism of reciprocity are adequate to the task.  
Indicates that the extrapolation of the findings of the study to complex issue-areas such as trade, 
environmental management, and technology are possible.
Stone, Christopher D., Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 
Am. J. Int’l L.276 (2004). (1c/e, 2, 6).
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Criticizes procedural rational choice approaches.  Expands the concept of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities,” which postulates that states are impressed with equal obligations 
but vary in their capacities for compliance, and suggests that enforcement costs will be reduced if 
more capable states make allowances for the less capable.  Elaborates a model for negotiating 
differential responsibilities that amalgamates managerial and rational choice theories.  Applies 
the model to the Kyoto Protocol.
Strauss, Andrew L., Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise 
of a People’s Assembly, 9 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 489 (1999). (1i/k, 4, 8).
Attributes responsibility for state compliance and non-compliance with international law 
to the elites at the apex of state power.  Contends that in practice the principle of the formal 
equality of states gives way to a hierarchy in which powerful states are able to prevent the 
effectiveness of international treaties by mobilizing opposition, as in the case of the U.S. and the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Advocates an international legislative body, termed Global Peoples Assembly, 
with the power to create and enforce laws directly against states and individuals.  Calls for 
“compliance from the inside out” whereby states, stripped of their status as the sole authors and 
primary enforcers of international law, would lose the power to determine whether their nationals 
complied in favor of this representative assembly, through which the will of their nationals 
would be given direct effect.
Sullivan, Scott M., Changing the Premise of International Legal Remedies: The Unfounded 
Adoption of Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition, 7 UCLA J. Int’l & Foreign Aff. 265 
(2002/2003). (5, 7)
Examines the introduction by the International Court of Justice of the mechanism of 
Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition [AGNR] as a novel remedy for breach of 
customary international legal obligations.  Surveys legitimacy theory and transnational legal 
process theory and concludes that the use of AGNRs is neither sufficiently legitimated nor 
adequately internalized as an operative norm within the international community to support the 
broader process of legalization.  
Swaine, Edward T., Rational Custom, 52 Duke L. J. 559 (2002). (1c/f, 2, 3, 9).
Contends, on the basis of empirical evidence, that the dispute between legitimacy theory 
and rational choice theory over the causal significance of norms to state behaviors can be 
reconciled through adoption of a thick theory of rationality.  Argues that under some 
circumstances even rational self-interested states may determine that complying with customary 
law may maximize their welfare because they regard affording respect to international legal 
processes or to particular normative principles as inherently valuable or, even more probably, 
because reputation matters.  Suggests that maximization of international cooperation must take 
into account the possibility that even self-interested states may actively seek to adhere to 
customary legal obligations.
Tallberg, Jonas, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 
Int’l Org. 609 (2002). (1b/e, 2, 5, 7, 10).
Assesses the competing claims of enforcement theory, which hypothesizes that the threat 
of sanctions induces compliance, and managerial theory, which contends that the inherent 
propensity of states to comply can be maximized through positive inducements, the provision of 
technical assistance, and the establishment of fora to aid negotiation and harmonization of 
policies and interests.  Examines the practice of the European Union, a regime that incorporates 
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elements of both enforcement and management in a “management enforcement ladder,” and 
concludes that the inclusion of both mechanisms creates the most effective regime.  Compares 
the EU to other international legal regimes, including the World Trade Organization, the 
European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights to conclude that the EU 
experience, though historically distinct, is replicable and that regimes in issue-areas such as 
trade, environmental protection, and human rights will achieve greatest effectiveness through a 
holistic approach to compliance.
Tay, Simon S.C., Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for International Environmental Law and 
Sustainable Development, 11 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 241 (1999). (1e, 2).
Advances the managerialist premise that the primary obstacle to compliance with 
environmental law is technical incapacity.  Notes that failures in compliance with environmental 
regimes have serious transborder consequences.  Enumerates myriad sources of and explanations 
for inadequate compliance support offered by existing international and regional organizational 
mechanisms.  Suggests that enhanced compliance with international environmental law will 
likely requre developed states and even private actors to offer positive inducements—“carrots”—
to states with low technical capacities.
Thompson, Alexander, Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and 
Pitfalls, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 285 (2002). (2, 8, 9).
Accepts the rational choice assumption that legal decisions are market-like choices, but 
faults rational choice theory for failing to offer a clear and testable definition of rationality.  
Concludes that the influences of reputation are less salient with regard to states than in regard to 
individuals.  Challenges scholars in the ILC field to properly model their theories by specifying 
testable and falsifiable hypotheses.
Trachtman, Joel P., Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. (1999). (2, 3).
Explains the proliferation of “soft law” agreements and the indeterminacy of international 
legal regimes as essential to attract and preserve powerful states as members by allowing them to 
avoid circumstances in which they perceive no alternative other than patent noncompliance.  
Rejects the transnational legal process prediction that obedience is the ultimate objective of 
international law and suggests instead that the possibilities for compliance will always be 
tempered by the realities of state self-interests.
Trimble, Philip, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 
811 (1990). (4, 5).
Advocates the centrality of international law to the construction of the post-Cold War 
international order.  Surveys the critical legal studies critique of realism.  Develops the liberalist 
premise that the first step in the diffusion of and compliance with international legal obligations 
is the incorporation of international law in the domestic legal systems of states.  Advances the 
core premise common to legitimacy theory and constructivism which holds that the perception 
by domestic elites in the judicial and executive branches of government that international legal 
obligations are legitimate is necessary to induce voluntary compliance. 
Tyler, Tom R., Compliance with International Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 
N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 219 (1997). (1h/k, 2, 5, 8, 10).
Surveys empirical studies that support the assertion that legal rules fail to marshal 
sufficient deterrent threats to enforce compliance.  Contends that effective legal regimes require 
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voluntary compliance, which in turn requires the promotion of a “culture of compliance” rooted 
in normative perceptions of law, and the institutions that administer law, as moral and legitimate.   
Identifies lack of trust in institutions and officials as a principal obstacle to the enhancement of 
legal legitimacy and proposes “moral development strategies” to re-establish trust. 
Weiss, Edith Brown, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: 
The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1555 (1999). (2, 5, 10).
Describes the concept of compliance in scalar, rather than dichotomous, terms, and 
contends that whether states adhere to their international agreements is a matter of degree.  
Distinguishes effectiveness from compliance and urges scholars to focus on the former.  Argues 
that the most effective agreements may be those that are tolerant of some defection.  Disputes the 
liberalist premise that democracies and free market polities are inherently more compliant than 
undemocratic states, and challenges the conclusion of enforcement theory that coercion is 
necessary to support cooperation.   Concludes that regime architects must be prepared to consider 
a range of strategies for inducing compliance and tailor each agreement to its membership.
Wendt, Alexander, Constructing International Politics, 20 Int’l Sec. 71 (1995). (1i, 8).
Hypothesizes that the fundamental structures of international relations are social rather 
than material and that these structures shape the identities and preferences of actors.  Contends 
that the subjective preferences of individuals, groups, and states can be constructed by 
transnational, interactive, and transformative social processes cumulatively known as 
globalization to favor cooperation and compliance with the normative content of legal regimes.   
Enunciates an important role for human agency in the social processes of construction of 
preferences favoring compliance with law.
Williamson, Richard L., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control Some 
Compliance Hypotheses, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 59 (2003). (1b, 2, 6, 7).
Distinguishes ‘effectiveness” from “compliance” in the context of arms control treaties. 
Identifies a number of factors that enhance compliance, including inclusion of all relevant states 
in treaty membership and maximization of the clarity of legal obligations.  Highlights 
methdological difficulties in assessing compliance, including sui generis nature of cases, absence 
of available data, and differential capacities of states. Briefly surveys ILC theories and propounds 
a series of testable hypotheses generally favoring “hard law” over “soft law” as more likely to 
foster compliance.
Yoshida, O., Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol’s Noncompliance Procedure 
and the Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 95 
(1999). (1e, 2, 6, 10).
Differentiates “hard” enforcement—international adjudication and sanctions—from 
“soft” enforcement—reporting, monitoring, and verification backed by financial incentives to 
compliance—in international environmental law.  Examines the application of soft enforcement 
mechanisms in the context of the ozone regimes.  Suggests that the selection of a flexible 
definition of “noncompliance,” coupled with soft enforcement mechanisms employed by treaty-
created institutions governed democratically and multilaterally by states-parties and free to 
employ not only principles of law but of equity in evaluating compliance, may well be the ideal 
approach to fostering cooperation more generally in the issue-area of environmental protection.
YOUNG, ORAN R., COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1979). (1k, 3, 5, 8).
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Discounts the causal significance of legal regulation in regard to the behavior of actors in 
social relations generally.  Treats individuals, the ultimate subjects of all law and the actors 
responsible for compliance decisions, as the relevant focus of ILC theories.  Hypothesizes that a 
host of individual psychological variables that tap a series of beliefs, motives, and images, such 
as the desire to generate reciprocity, altruism, reputational concerns, fear of sanctions, social 
pressures, or moral obligations, better explain and predict the phenomenon of compliance 
decisionmaking than variables drawn from other levels of analysis.
